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Abstract
Penalty shootout in soccer is recognized to be unfair because the team kicking first in
all rounds enjoys a significant advantage. The so-called Catch-Up Rule has been sug-
gested recently to solve this problem but is shown here not to be fairer than the simpler
deterministic Alternating (ABBA) Rule that has already been tried. We introduce the
Adjusted Catch-Up Rule by guaranteeing the first penalty of the possible sudden death
stage to the team disadvantaged in the first round. It outperforms the Catch-Up and
Alternating Rules, while remains straightforward to implement. A general measure of
complexity for penalty shootout mechanisms is also provided as the minimal number
of binary questions required to decide the first-mover in a given round without know-
ing the history of the penalty shootout. This quantification permits a two-dimensional
evaluation of any mechanism proposed in the future.
Keywords Sports rules · Soccer · Penalty shootout · Mechanism design · Fairness
Mathematics Subject Classification 60J20 · 91A05 · 91A80
1 Introduction
Fairness has several interpretations in sports, one basic desideratum being the inter-
pretation of the Aristotelian Justice principle: higher-ability competitors should win
with a higher probability alongside the equal treatment of equals. In particular, we
address the problem of penalty shootouts in soccer (association football) from this
point of view.
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According to the current rulebook of soccer, Laws of the Game 2019/20, “when
competition rules require a winning team after a drawn match or home-and-away tie,
the only permitted procedures to determine the winning team are: (a) away goals rule;
(b) two equal periods of extra time not exceeding 15 minutes each; (c) kicks from
the penalty mark” (IFAB 2019, Section 10). In the ultimate case of item c), a coin is
tossed to decide the goal at which the kicks will be taken. Then the referee tosses a
coin again, the winner decides whether to take the first or second kick, and five kicks
are taken alternately by both teams (if, before both teams have taken five kicks, one
has scored more goals than the other could score, even if it were to complete its five
kicks, no more kicks are taken). If the scores are still level after five rounds, the kicks
continue in the sudden death stage until one team scores a goal more than the other
from the same number of kicks. Following Brams and Ismail (2018), we will refer to
this rule as the Standard (AB AB) Rule.
Since most penalties are successful in soccer, the player taking the second kick is
usually under greater mental pressure, especially from the third or fourth penalties
onward, when a miss probably means the loss of the match. Consequently, the team
kicking first in a penalty shootout is recognized to win significantly more frequently
than 50 percent of the time (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta 2010; Palacios-Huerta
2014; Da Silva et al. 2018; Rudi et al. 2019), indicating the unfairness of the Standard
(AB AB) Rule.
Therefore, three alternative mechanisms for penalty shootouts will be considered
here:
• Alternating (AB B A) Rule: the order of the first two penalties (AB) is mirrored in
the next two (B A), and this sequence continues even in the possible sudden death
stage of the shootout (the sixth round of penalties is started by team B, the seventh
by team A, and so on).
• Catch-Up Rule (Brams and Ismail 2018): the order of the penalties in a given round,
including the sudden death, is the mirror image of the previous round except if the
first team failed and the second scored in the previous round when the order of the
teams remains unchanged.
• Adjusted Catch-Up Rule: the first five rounds of penalties, started by team A, are
kicked according to the Catch-Up Rule, but team B is guaranteed to be the first
kicker in the sudden death stage (sixth round).
Note that the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule combines the other two mechanisms: it coin-
cides with the Catch-Up Rule in the first five rounds and with the Alternating (AB B A)
Rule in the sudden death stage.
The three designs will be compared concerning not only fairness but also simplicity
because achieving fairness has a price in increasing complexity.
The contribution of our research resides in the following points:
1. We find that the Catch-Up Rule, promoted by Brams and Ismail (2018), does
not outperform the simpler and already tried Alternating (AB B A) Rule under the
assumptions of the same authors, which substantially reduces the importance of a
central result of Brams and Ismail (2018);
2. We show that the proposed Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than both alternative
penalty shootout designs;
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3. We suggest the first general complexity measure of penalty shootout mechanisms
in the literature that remains consistent with the view of the decision-makers. It is
based on theminimal number of binary questions required to decide the first-mover
in a given round of the penalty shootout without knowing its history.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the problem of penalty
shootouts, while Sect. 3 analyzes the fairness of the three penalty shootout designs
presented above. Quantification of the complexity of an arbitrary rule is provided in
Sect. 4. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
2 An overview of penalty shootouts
Soccer is typically a game with a low number of scores, hence ties, even the result
of 0-0, are relatively common. Since in knockout (elimination) tournaments only one
team advances to the next round, these ties should be broken.
Before 1970, soccer matches that were tied after extra time were either decided by a
coin toss or replayed. However, events in the 1968European football championship led
FIFA, the international governing body of association football, to try penalty shootouts
(Anbarcı et al 2019).1 In the following decades, penalty shootout has become the
standard tie-breaking procedure in knockout tournaments.
Besides, penalty shootout may be a specific tie-breaking rule in round-robin tour-
naments. For example, in the group stage of the 2020 UEFA European Football
Championship, if two teams, which have the same number of points and the same
number of goals scored and conceded, play their last group match against each other
and are still equal at the end of that match, their final rankings are determined by kicks
from the penalty mark, provided that no other teams within the group have the same
number of points on completion of all group matches (UEFA 2018, Article 20.02).2
In the 1988–89 season of the Argentinian League, all drawnmatches went to penal-
ties without extra time, when the winner of the shootout obtained two points, and the
loser one point (Palacios-Huerta 2014, Section 10). A similar rule was applied in the
1994–95 Australian National Soccer League, except that a regular win was awarded
by four points (Kendall and Lenten 2017, Section 3.9.7).
2.1 On the fairness of penalty shootouts
Penalty shootouts have inspired many academic researchers to investigate the issue of
fairness as they offer excellent natural experiments despite a substantial rule change
in their implementation: before June 2003, the team that won the random coin toss
had to take the first kick, and after July 2003, the winner of the coin toss can choose
the order of kicking. The stakeholders also feel potential problems, more than 90% of
1 The tied semifinal (after extra time) between Italy and the Soviet Union was decided by a coin toss for
Italy. The final between Italy and Yugoslavia ended in a draw of 1-1 even after 30 minutes extra time, thus
it was replayed two days later.
2 Despite the restrictive conditions, it remains not only a theoretical possibility: in the elite round of 2016
UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualification, Poland overtook Ireland in Group 7, and Belgium
was ranked higher than Spain in Group 8 due to this particular rule.
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coaches and players asked in a survey want to go first, mainly because they attempt to
put psychological pressure on the other team (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta 2010).3
Denote the two teams by A and B, where A is the first kicker. According to
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010), team A wins with the probability of 60.5%
based on 129 pre-2003 penalty shootouts and with the probability of 59.2% based
on 269 shootouts that include post-2003 cases. The advantage of the first-mover is
statistically significant. However, using a superset of their pre-2003 sample with 540
shootouts, Kocher et al. (2012) report this value to be only 53.3% and insignificant.
Palacios-Huerta (2014) further expands the database to 1001 penalty shootouts played
before 2012 to get a 60.6% winning probability for the first team. Vandebroek et al.
(2018) explain this disagreement with insufficient sample sizes, they find that even
a relatively small but meaningful lagging-behind effect (the team having less score
succeeds with only a 70% probability instead of 75%) cannot be reliably identified if
only 500 penalty shootouts are considered.
Da Silva et al. (2018) collect 232 penalty shootout situations and get a 59.48%
winning probability for team A, which is statistically significant. On the other hand,
Arrondel et al. (2019) show no advantage based on 252 French penalty shootouts.
However, their results reveal that the probability of scoring is negatively affected by
the stake (the impact of my scoring on the expected probability that my team will
eventually win) and the difficulty of the situation (the ex-ante probability of my team
eventually losing). Finally,Rudi et al. (2019) investigate 1635penalty shootouts,which
leads to a statistically significant 54.86% winning probability for team A. Although
this is closer in magnitude to the value presented by Kocher et al. (2012) than to the
findings of Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) and Palacios-Huerta (2014), the
larger sample size enables a more precise estimation and higher statistical power to
detect the possible advantage.
Similar problems may arise in other sports such as handball, ice hockey, or water
polo (Anbarcı et al 2019). Cohen-Zada et al. (2018) and Da Silva et al. (2018) find
that the AB B A pattern does not favor the player who serves first in a tennis tiebreak.
According toGonzález-Díaz and Palacios-Huerta (2016), the player drawing thewhite
pieces in the odd games of amulti-stage chess contest has about 60% chance to win the
match. Therefore, since the World Chess Championship 2006, the colors are reversed
halfway through in the match containing twelve scheduled games as one player plays
with the white pieces in the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 10th, 12th games according to the
AB AB AB|B AB AB A sequence.
To summarize, while the empirical evidence remains somewhat controversial, it
seems probable that the team kicking the first penalty enjoys an advantage, which
is widely regarded as unfair. This fact is also recognized by the IFAB (International
Football Association Board), the rule making body of soccer: Laws of the Game
2017/18 explicitly says in its section discussing the future that the IFAB will consult
widely on a number of important Law-related topics, including “a potentially fairer
system of taking kicks from the penalty mark” (IFAB 2017).4
3 An interesting exception was a quarterfinal of the 2018 FIFAWorld Cup when the Croatian team captain
Luka Modrić chose to kick the second penalties despite winning the coin toss against Russia (Mirror 2018).
4 This sentence appears in the same place in Laws of the Game 2018/19 (IFAB 2018), but is missing from
Laws of the Game 2019/20 (IFAB 2019).
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2.2 Alternative mechanisms for penalty shootouts
The IFAB has decided to test the Alternating (AB B A) Rule. The trial was initially
scheduled at the 2017 UEFA European Under-17 Championship and the 2017 UEFA
Women’s Under-17 Championship, organized in May 2017 (UEFA 2017b), and was
extended to the 2017 UEFA European Under-19 Championship and the 2017 UEFA
Women’s Under-19 Championship in the following month (UEFA 2017a). The first
implementation of the new system was a penalty shootout between Germany and
Norway in theWomen’sUnder-17Championship semifinal on 11May2017 (Thomson
Reuters 2017).
Thismechanismwas applied in the 2017FACommunity Shield, too,whereArsenal,
the winner of the 2017 FA Cup Final, won after an AB B A penalty shootout against
Chelsea, the champions of the 2016/17 Premier League. There was even a controversy
in the Dutch KNVBCup in 2017when a referee erroneously employed the Alternating
(AB B A) rule during a penalty shootout, hence it should be replayed three weeks after
(Mirror 2017).
However, the 133rd Annual Business Meeting (ABM) of the IFAB agreed that the
Alternating (AB B A) rule will no longer be a future option for competitions due to “the
absence of strong support, mainly because the procedure is complex” (FIFA 2018).
Academic researchers have proposed some further rules to increase fairness
(Anbarcı et al 2019; Brams and Ismail 2018; Echenique 2017; Palacios-Huerta 2012).
Our point of departure is the Catch-Up Rule (Brams and Ismail 2018), which takes
into account the results of penalties in the preceding round to allow the team perform-
ing worse to catch up. Assume that team A kicks first in a particular round, thus it is
advantaged. In the next round, team B will kick first except if A fails and B succeeds.
We suggest a slight improvement in this mechanism. Note that the penalty shootout
is essentially composed of two parts, the first five rounds, and the possible sudden
death stage. Therefore, it makes sense to balance the advantage of the first-mover by
making it disadvantaged at the beginning of the sudden death. Formally, if team A
starts the shootout, then team B will kick first in the sixth round, provided that it is
reached. Under the original Catch-Up Rule, it is possible that A kicks first in the sixth
round, for instance, when it leads by 4-3 after four rounds, but A fails and B succeeds
in the fifth round of penalty kicks. This variant of the Catch-Up Rule, which a priori
fixes the first-mover in the sudden death, is called the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule.
Table 1 illustrates how the four rules work. The Red team is the first kicker, ✔
means a successful, and ✗ indicates an unsuccessful penalty. Since the result after five
rounds is 3-3, the sudden death stage starts: the Red team kicks first in the sixth round
according to the Catch-Up Rule as the Blue team was the first-mover in the previous
round, but the Blue team kicks first in the sixth round when the Adjusted Catch-Up
Rule is used because it was disadvantaged in the first round.
3 The analysis of three penalty shootout designs
Following the literature on penalty shootouts, fairness means that no team enjoys an
advantage because of winning or losing the coin toss.
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Table 1 An example of penalty shootout rules
Table 2 Penalty shootout
success rates per round Source:
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta
(2010, p. 2558)
First kicker Second kicker
Round 1 0.79 0.72
Round 2 0.82 0.77
Round 3 0.77 0.64
Round 4 0.74 0.68
Round 5 0.74 0.67
Definition 1 Fairness: A penalty shootout mechanism is fair if the probability of
winning does not depend on the outcome of the coin toss.
Consequently, in ourmathematicalmodel, amechanism is called fairer than another
if the probability of winning the match conditional on winning the coin toss is closer
to 0.5 for equally skilled teams.
The standard AB AB rule will not be discussed here because it has already been
investigated in Brams and Ismail (2018)—and is markedly unfair.
3.1 Fairness: a simple model which solely depends on the order
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010, p. 2558) provide empirical probabilities for
scoring a penalty on each round, presented in Table 2. It can be seen that the team kick-
ing first in a given round always succeeds with a higher probability. Hence, following
Brams and Ismail (2018), we use the reasonable assumption that the probability of a
successful penalty depends only on whether the team kicks first or second in a round:
the advantaged team has a probability p of scoring, and the disadvantaged team has
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a probability q(≤ p) of scoring. Similarly to Brams and Ismail (2018), our baseline
choice is p = 3/4 and q = 2/3, which are close to the empirical success rates given in
Table 2, especially in the last three rounds. This corresponds to about a 60% chance of
winning for the first-mover as observed in practice by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta
(2010) and Palacios-Huerta (2014).
To illustrate the model, Brams and Ismail (2018) analyze the Catch-Up Rule for a
penalty shootout over only two rounds and derive that p = 3/4 and q = 2/3 result in:
• the probability of team A winning is P2(A) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;5
• the probability of team B winning is P2(B) = 39/144 ≈ 0.270;
• the probability of a tie is P2(T ) = 64/144 ≈ 0.444.
If there is a tie after two rounds, the shootout goes to sudden death.Assume that team
A kicks first and let W (A) be the probability of winning for team A in the sudden death
stage. The Catch-Up, Adjusted Catch-Up, and Alternating (AB B A) Rules coincide
in this stage, the calculations of Brams and Ismail (2018) remain valid, that is,
W (A) = 1 − q + pq
2 − p − q + 2pq . (1)
For p = 3/4 and q = 2/3, one gets W (A) = 10/19 ≈ 0.526.
If the penalty shootout is played over two rounds before sudden death, the proba-
bility of a tie is P2(T ) = 64/144. Under the Catch-Up Rule, A kicks first in the third
round with a probability of 58/144 ≈ 0.403, while B kicks first in the third round
with a probability of 6/144 ≈ 0.042 because team B will kick first only in the case of
the following sequence: A fails, B scores, A scores, B fails, which has a probability
of (1 − p)qp(1 − q). Consequently, the probability that team A wins is
Q2(A) = P2(A) + 58
144
× 10
19
+ 6
144
× 9
19
= 1413
2736
≈ 0.516.
On the other hand, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule guarantees the first penalty in the
sudden death for team B, hence the probability that team A wins under this mechanism
is
Q2(A) = P2(A) +
(
58
144
+ 6
144
)
× 9
19
= 1355
2736
≈ 0.495.
Amore detailed discussion of the Alternating (AB B A) Rule is provided because it
is missing from Brams and Ismail (2018) but can contribute to a better understanding
of the model. There are three ways for team A to win a penalty shootout over two
rounds:
(I) 2-0: A scores on both rounds while B fails to score on both rounds
On the first round, A succeeds and B fails with probability p(1 − q). On the
second round, B kicks first and fails, while A kicks second and succeeds with
5 Brams and Ismail (2018, p. 188) contains a rounding error. Superscript 2 indicates that the probability
concerns a penalty shootout over two rounds.
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probability (1 − p)q. The joint probability of this outcome over the two rounds
is p(1 − q)(1 − p)q.
(II) 2-1: A scores on both rounds while B fails to score on one of these rounds
There are two subcases:
• B scores on the first round
On this round, both teams succeed with probability pq. On the second round,
B kicks first and fails, while A kicks second and scores with probability
(1 − p)q. The joint probability over both rounds is pq(1 − p)q.
• B scores on the second round
On the first round, A succeeds and B fails with probability p(1 − q). On
the second round, B kicks first and succeeds, after which A also scores, with
probability pq. The joint probability over both rounds is p(1 − q)pq.
Hence the probability of the outcome 2-1 is
pq(1 − p)q + p(1 − q)pq.
(III) 1-0: A scores on one round while B fails to score on both rounds
There are two subcases:
• A scores on the first round
On this round, A succeeds and B fails with probability p(1 − q). On the
second round, both teams fail with probability (1 − p)(1 − q). The joint
probability over the two rounds is p(1 − q)(1 − p)(1 − q).
• A scores on the second round
On the first round, both teams fail with probability (1 − p)(1 − q). On the
second round, B kicks first and fails, after which A succeeds, with probability
(1− p)q. The joint probability over the two rounds is (1− p)(1−q)(1− p)q.
Thus the probability of the outcome 1-0 is
p(1 − q)(1 − p)(1 − q) + (1 − p)(1 − q)(1 − p)q.
The assumption p = 3/4 and q = 2/3 implies that:
• the probability of team A winning is P2(A) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;
• the probability of team B winning is P2(B) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;
• the probability of a tie is P2(T ) = 62/144 ≈ 0.431.
Unsurprisingly, this rule leads to equal winning probabilities for the two teams over
two rounds as two is an even number.
The Alternating (AB B A) Rule provides the first penalty in the sudden death for
team A because it is the third round, hence the probability that team A wins is
Q2(A) = P2(A) + 62
144
× 10
19
= 1399
2736
≈ 0.511.
To summarize, while all three alternative designs tend to equalize the winning
probabilities compared to the Standard (AB AB) Rule, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
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Table 3 The probability that A wins including sudden death (p = 3/4 and q = 2/3)
Catch-Up Rule Adjusted Catch-Up Rule Alternating (AB B A) Rule
1 Round 0.526 0.526 0.526
2 Rounds 0.516 0.495 0.511
3 Rounds 0.518 0.515 0.519
4 Rounds 0.513 0.501 0.508
5 Rounds 0.514 0.509 0.515
6 Rounds 0.512 0.504 0.507
7 Rounds 0.512 0.507 0.513
8 Rounds 0.511 0.504 0.506
seems to be the closest to fairness. In particular, theCatch-Up andAlternating (AB B A)
Rules give 100×(0.516/0.484−1) ≈ 6.8% and 4.64% advantage for the team kicking
thefirst penalty, respectively,while theAdjustedCatch-UpRule results in an advantage
of only 1.92% for the other team in a penalty shootout over two rounds with sudden
death.
The winning probabilities of the advantaged team, which kicks the first penalty, are
shown in Table 3 for penalty shootouts lasting eight or fewer predetermined rounds
followed by sudden death when p = 3/4 and q = 2/3. Note that the probabilities for
the Catch-Up Rule have already been reported in Brams and Ismail (2018) up to five
rounds.
All three methods, especially the Alternating (AB B A) Rule, exhibit a small odd-
even effect since their bias is greater for an odd number of predetermined rounds. As
expected, they make the contest fairer if the number of rounds increases. The simplest
Alternating (AB B A) Rule is better than the Catch-Up Rule for an even number of
rounds, while the latter has a marginal advantage for an odd number of rounds.
However, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule consistently outperforms both of them. The
smallest imbalance can be observed for a penalty shootout played over four rounds,
followed by sudden death if the shootout remains unresolved. In this case, the team
kicking first has only 0.58% more chance to win under the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule.
Until now, we have investigated only the case of p = 3/4 and q = 2/3. Figure 1
plots the winning probabilities of team A using the presented rules for different values
of p as a function of q, where 0.5 ≤ q ≤ p since the penalties in soccer are usually
successful. It shows that the order of these designs with respect to fairness is not
influenced by the particular parameters chosen: the Catch-Up and the Alternating
(AB B A) Rules remain almost indistinguishable, and the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
turns out to be the best as before. Furthermore, all mechanisms are fairer if p is closer
to q, according to our intuition.
Unfortunately, there is no hope to analytically derive conditions for p and q which
make the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule fairer compared to the other designs even in this
simple mathematical model. The reason is that the five rounds of penalties imply
210 = 1024 different cases, and the probability of each is given by a formula containing
123
L. Csató
0.5
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
Value of q
p = 0.65
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
Value of q
p = 0.7
0.5
0.5
0.52
0.54
Value of q
p = 0.75
Catch-Up Rule Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
Alternating (ABBA) Rule
0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.5
0.52
0.54
Value of q
p = 0.8
Fig. 1 The probability that A wins a shootout over five rounds including sudden death
the product of ten items from the set of p, q, (1− p), and (1−q). Nevertheless, Fig. 1
supports this conjecture by reinforcing the lack of non-linear effects.
3.2 Fairness: empirical round dependent scoring probabilities
The three rules can also be compared in the view of the empirical round dependent
probabilities from Table 2. Since success rates in the sudden death stage are uncertain
due to the small sample size, it is assumed that our former mathematical model holds
after five rounds with the fixed probabilities p and q. Figure 2 presents the results of
these calculations.While theCatch-UpRule is closer to fairness based on the empirical
data than the Alternating (AB B A) Rule, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule remains the
winner.
We have attempted to determine the scoring probabilities p and q(≤ p) in the
sudden death stage which make the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule fairer than the other two
mechanisms. Formally, suppose that the following values are known:
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(2/3; 3/5) (3/4; 2/3) (3/4; 3/5)
0.5
0.52
0.54
Probabilities of scoring in the sudden death (p; q)
Catch-Up Rule Adjusted Catch-Up Rule Alternating (ABBA) Rule
Fig. 2 The empirical probability that A wins a penalty shootout over five rounds including sudden death
• P5(A): the probability that A wins a penalty shootout over five rounds without
sudden death under the Catch-Up Rule;
• P5A(T ): the probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds is tied under the
Catch-Up Rule and A kicks the sixth penalty according to the Catch-Up Rule;
• P5B(T ): the probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds is tied under the
Catch-Up Rule and B kicks the sixth penalty according to the Catch-Up Rule.
Furthermore, denote by α the probability of winning the sudden death by the team
that kicks first in this stage. Formula (1) implies 0.5 ≤ α because of the assumption
q ≤ p to incorporate the psychological effect, which is probably even stronger in the
sudden death.
Then the overall probability of winning for team A under the Catch-Up Rule is
P5(A) + P5A(T ) × α + P5B(T ) × (1 − α) , (2)
while the overall probability of winning for team A under the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
is
P5(A) +
(
P5A(T ) + P5B(T )
)
× (1 − α) . (3)
The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than the Catch-Up Rule if the value of (3) is
closer to 0.5 than the value of (2). By using the round dependent empirical scoring
probabilities of Table 2, this results in 0.5 ≤ α ≤ α(CU ) ≈ 0.6569. Thus theAdjusted
Catch-Up Rule becomes fairer than the Catch-Up Rule if
0.5 ≤ 1 − q + pq
2 − p − q + 2pq ≤ α(CU ) ⇐⇒
1 − 2α(CU ) + α(CU )p
1 − p − α + 2α(CU )p ≤ q ≤ p.
An analogous calculation leads to the conclusion that the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is
fairer than the AB B A Rule if 0.5 ≤ α ≤ α(AB B A) ≈ 0.6252.
The range of values (p; q), q ≤ p for the scoring probabilities in sudden death that
makes the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule fairer than the other two penalty shootout designs
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0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Value of p
V
al
ue
of
q
Region where it is fairer than the Catch-Up Rule
Region where it is fairer than the Alternating (ABBA) Rule
Fig. 3 The fixed scoring probabilities in sudden death which guarantee that the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is
fairer than the other penalty shootout designs
(2/3; 3/5) (3/4; 2/3) (3/4; 3/5) Empirical
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Values of (p; q)
(Adjusted) Catch-Up Rule Alternating (ABBA) Rule
Fig. 4 The probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds goes to sudden death
with the empirical results from Table 2 are plotted in Fig. 3. Our proposal outperforms
theCatch-UpRule in the region indicated by the blue vertical lines, while it is preferred
to the Alternating (AB B A) Rule in the region indicated by the green horizontal lines
(the latter is a subset of the former). Since any reasonable value of q lies between these
bounds, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is the closest to fairness among the three designs
with the empirical round dependent success rates of Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta
(2010).
3.3 Beyond fairness: expected length and strategy-proofness
In the model above, the expected length of the sudden death stage is 1/(p +q −2pq),
the same for all mechanisms (Brams and Ismail 2018). The Catch-Up and Adjusted
Catch-Up Rules differ only in which team kicks the first penalty of the sudden death.
However, the probability of reaching this stage is greater with the (Adjusted) Catch-
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Up Rule than with the Alternating (AB B A) Rule as Fig. 4 illustrates based on some
particular values of p and q, as well as the empirical round dependent success rates
given in Table 2. Consequently, the former mechanisms canmake the penalty shootout
somewhat more exciting.
It has been presented recently that certain sports rules do not satisfy incentive
compatibility, that is, a team might be strictly better off by exerting a lower effort
(Csató 2018, 2019; Dagaev and Sonin 2018; Kendall and Lenten 2017; Vong 2017).
The Alternating (AB B A) Rule is not vulnerable to any kind of strategic manipulation
since neither team can influence the order of shooting. According to Brams and Ismail
(2018), no team is interested in missing a kick under the Catch-Up Rule if (p − q) ≤
1/2,which seems likely to bemet in practice. TheAdjustedCatch-UpRule offers fewer
opportunities to change the order of the penalties since the first-mover in sudden death
is fixed, therefore it also satisfies strategy-proofness if the condition (p − q) ≤ 1/2
holds.
4 The complexity of penalty shootout designs
Since the IFAB has stopped the trials of the Alternating (AB B A) Rule due to its com-
plexity, this should be another important feature of mechanisms for penalty shootouts.
The first attempt to quantify their simplicity has been provided in Anbarcı et al (2015),
and has been repeated in Anbarcı et al (2019). They call a rule simple if it has a station-
ary machine representation with only two states such that in one state team A kicks
first and in the other team B kicks first. However, this measure is not consistent with
the decision of the IFAB (FIFA 2018) because it judges the Standard (AB AB) and the
Alternating (AB B A) Rules to have the same level of complexity.
Rudi et al. (2019) suggest another measure of simplicity but they choose complex-
ity levels somewhat arbitrarily and their approach is not able to classify stochastic
mechanisms (such as the Catch-Up Rule), which depend on the outcome of previous
penalties.
Thus we provide a procedure that quantifies the complexity of any penalty shootout
design, remains intuitive, and is consistent with the recent decision of the IFAB.
Definition 2 Complexity: Suppose that the mathematician should report the referee on
which team is the first-mover in the next round of a penalty shootout. The mathemati-
cian has initially no information but she can ask binary questions on the history of
the shootout including the number of the next round. The complexity of any penalty
shootout mechanism is the minimal number of questions needed to determine the first
kicking team in a given round, taking into account that the questions and their number
might depend on the answer(s) to the preceding question(s).
In other words, there is an information asymmetry between the mathematician and
the referee as the former knows only the rules, while the latter knows only the history
of the shootout.
Definition 2 can be applied to reveal the simplicity of a penalty shootoutmechanism.
Proposition 1 The complexities of some penalty shootout designs are as follows:
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• Standard (AB AB) Rule: 0;
• Alternating (AB B A) Rule: 1;
• Catch-Up Rule: 2;
• Adjusted Catch-Up Rule: between 2 and 3.
Proof According to the Standard (AB AB) Rule, team A will be the first-mover in the
next round of penalties, which is known without asking any question.
The Alternating (AB B A) Rule requires the knowledge of the parity (odd: team A,
even: team B) of the next round’s number.
The Catch-Up Rule can be implemented by asking two questions because it depends
on the first kicker in the previous round and on the fact whether the first kicker has
failed but the second has scored in the previous round or not.
The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule first requires the knowledge of whether the sudden death
stage is reached or not. After that, either the Alternating (AB B A) Rule (one question)
or the Catch-Up Rule (two questions) is applied. 
Our approach seems to provide reasonable estimates of simplicity. For example, the
design consisting of three rounds of AB B A followed by Catch-Up is between 2 and 3:
first, the mathematician should know whether the next round is one of the first three or
not, and then the appropriate design can be implemented with further one (AB B A) or
two (Catch-Up) questions. However, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is probably simpler
than this artificial mechanism because changing the doctrine at the beginning of the
sudden death stage can be considered less costly compared to changing the doctrine
after three rounds as the rule of aggregation is modified in the sudden death anyway.
Hence the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule can be judged only marginally more complex than
the Catch-Up Rule.
The application of amore complexmechanism remains questionable unless it yields
meaningful gains in fairness and other aspects. The Catch-Up Rule does not seem to
be fairer than the Alternating (AB B A) Rule based on Table 3 and Fig. 1, which
reduces the significance of Brams and Ismail (2018)’s proposal. On the other hand,
our Adjusted Catch-Up Rule dominates both of them except for a small increase in
complexity.
5 Conclusions
Tournament organizers supposedly want to guarantee fairness. However, the stan-
dard penalty shootout mechanism in soccer contains a well-known bias favoring the
first shooter. This means a problem because an order of actions that provides an ex-
post advantage to one team may harm efficiency by decreasing the probability of the
stronger team to win. Consequently, there is little excuse to continue the use of the
current rule.
We have demonstrated by a mathematical model that the recently suggested Catch-
Up Rule is not worth implementing since it is not fairer than the less complex
Alternating (AB B A) Rule already tried. On the other hand, the Adjusted Catch-Up
Rule can be considered as a promising candidate to make penalty shootouts fairer
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and even more exciting. Finally, the proposed quantification of complexity permits a
two-dimensional evaluation of any mechanism proposed in the future.
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